Yog hais tias koj twb tau muab kev koom tes rau hauv online (computer) ua lag ua luam rau cov sijhawm uas tsim nyog, los yog cia li tau ncig lub Web site no feem ntau, tsis doubt koj yuav tsum paub txog “419” Nigerian txog; aka nam nqi kev dag. Cov no muaj me ntsis tau cov kabmob ntawm ecommerce, tiam sis yog ib tug tubntxhais tshiab Nigerian-yam uas scam muaj lawv ib feem loj loj rau hauv internet cov tub txawj tub ntse; tus “shipping ntaus khoom” kws txuj ci dag, ntxiv rau ntawd tom qab.

“419” – Nigerian txog

Just thaum koj nyob nraum ib tus muaj hmoo ob peb leej twb yeej tsis tau hassled los 419 scammers, Nws yog cov kws txuj ci rau hiob Nigerian dag ib ncig. Kws txuj ci no classic Nigerian dag no tseem tshaj tus nqi rau kev dag. My father used to work with the Department of Consumer Afffairs in Australia in the 1980’s and he saw it regularly then. Nyob rau hauv cov hnub nws tau ris los ntawm kev xa ntawv, fax mus thiab xov tooj. Txawm tias nws tau mob heev xovxwm mam, it’s estimated that billions of dollars are fleeced from unsuspecting (and greedy) people each year.

The target receives an email claiming to be from an official representative of an important official (royalty, government). The scammer doesn’t ask for money up front, but wants to establish a working relationship with the target to help transfer money (which doesn’t exist) out of Nigeria or other African countries on behalf of their “client”.

The target is promised a healthy fee for their assistance, sometimes millions of dollars. There are other variations on this theme, but the the basics remain – a large sum of cash needing to be transferred to a Western country.

The scammer sends official looking documents etc. to convince the target of their credentials. The scammer then gets the target’s bank details under the premise of depositing cash *into* their account.

That’s when problems start occurring. The scammer tells the target that in order to shift the money, they need to bribe government officials or pay for security of the transporting of the cash etc. The target often pays large amounts of money in order to help these scammers to release the fictitious amounts of cash. The scammer will siphon from the target for as long as they possibly can.

Up until recently, 419 scammers had reasonably free reign in Nigeria and were fearless in their approaches. Nws yog kuv to taub tias tsoom fwv Nigerian yog tam sim no cracking rau cov gangs. Tseem, nws tsis tshwm sim los muaj tub ceevxwm hauv cov kws txuj ci dag emails kuv txais tau tsawg. Thaum uas cov kws txuj ci dag Nigerian yam nyob rau lwm lub teb chaws, feem coob lawv yuav yog los ntawm cov neeg Asmeskas no.

Nigerian txog rau ecommerce

Nws yog ib qho tshaj plaws tsis muaj hmoo tias txhua txhua lub sij hawm no kuv hnov lo lus “Nigeria”, Kuv xav instantly tias “kev dag”. Nyob rau xyoo ze li ntawm ib tug caum uas nyob rau hauv lub Web site, Kuv tau hais tias muaj ib tug yawm degree muaj tseeb tias kuv tau txais *1* tseeb lag luam email originating ntawm Nigeria. Feem ntau lwm tub txawj tub ntse yuav tau zoo yaam puab paub. I feel very sorry for those legitimate merchants trying to run an online business on a global scale from African countries; it must be very challenging for them.

In my article on card fraud strategies, I mention that tracing the IP on an order receipt is a good way to prevent being defrauded. Also, if the billing address is the USA and the delivery address is Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe or other high risk countries, you can be reasonably confident that the order is fraud.

The Nigerian scammers realize this and have added a new string to their bow – tus “shipping ntaus khoom” kws txuj ci dag.

Nigerian “shipping ntaus khoom” kws txuj ci dag

As with the 419 kws txuj ci dag, Nigeria is not the only source of the shipping clerk scam, but it does appear to be the major point of origin currently. Here’s how it works:

– The scammers steal the credit card numbers

– Lawv txhij tib neeg ntawm postings email thiab cov rooj sab laj nyob lwm thaj teb chaws xws li lub teb chaws USA no los ua ib tug tub taw tes rau khoom – i.e. ib “shipping ntaus khoom”. Lawv tej zaum kuj pab kom raws li lub tuam txhab export xav tau kev pab neeg tau thaj, xav txhij clerks li nyiaj them poob haujlwm processors.

Kuv tau txais ib “recruitment” tsab ntawv ob peb hnub dhau los; ntawm no yog ib cov qauv:

——

Kuv sawv cev lub npe raws li nyob rau hauv Lagos, Nigeria. Kuv niaj hnub yuav hauv khoom los ntawm thoob plaws lub ntiaj teb no kev muag khoom ntxiv mus rau hauv Nigeria thiab peb yuav tau txhim khu kev qha shipping clerks mus ua reshippers. Peb yuav them rau cov khoom siv thiab kom lawv shipped rau koj. Nyeg, koj yuav nkoj lawv mus rau peb – peb yuav muab koj muaj menyuam mus saib them shipping thawv thiab lwm yam.

Peb xaiv hom lag luam no kom nws circumvents tej lub logistical teeb meem peb muaj tej yav tag los.

Note that, as our representative, you will receive $x for each $x value of goods we purchase that you ship to us. Please, to facilitate the conclusion of this transaction if accepted, do send me promptly by email the following:

(1)Your full names,

(2)Contact address and,

(3)Phone/fax numbers.

———-

In some emails, Nigeria may not be mentioned. The scammer may state they are based in another country such as the UK; but when the clerk is “hooked”, they are directed to ship to another country.

– The scammers then place orders with the stolen card numbers using a forged IP in order to make the order look as though it came from country of the cardholders’ address. They would use a delivery address of the shipping clerk.

– The shipping clerk receives the goods and then reships them to the scammers.

– Tus tsis ntaus khoom shipping them ntawm ib tug neeg khaws nyiaj 's kos, twg tseem dag. Feem ntau cov kos yog ntau tshaj ntawm cov nyiaj tus ntaus khoom, ces tus ntaus khoom yuav qhia wire cov dhau heev lawm rau qhov scammer

or

– Lawv yuav xa cov “ntaus khoom” cov checks dag cashiers, ntawm lub scammers purportedly “neeg” rau tus ntaus khoom yuav nyiaj ntsuab, yog tus ntaus khoom kom txhob muaj ib feem pua thiab wire tas rau lub scammer.

Tom qab lub sij hawm lub sij hawm, cov txhab nyiaj cashed rau ntawm daim tshev yuav pom tias nws yog kev dag thiab tus ntaus khoom no ces nyog rau tag nrho cov nqi.

Tus reshipping hauv lub, ces tsis tas yuav tus “ntaus khoom” tau stung, tab sis cov tub txawj tub los tus ntse uas muab khoom. Cov neeg ua lag luam tsis tsuas loses cov khoom, tab sis yuav tej zaum kuj raug ib qhov nqi chargeback. Yog tias ib tug neeg ua lag luam muaj txaus chargebacks kaw rau lawv, then their account with the processor may also be threatened or higher processing fees applied.

This kind of scam has cost ecommerce merchants millions of dollars in the last year. It is difficult to catch as all the usual initial anti-fraud screens would see it as a legitimate order; i.e., the order IP matches the country as does the delivery address. In some cases, the scammer may provide the credit card details to the clerk and direct them which goods to buy and from where.

In order for merchants to pick up on these sorts of fraudulent transactions, further screening is required. It’s not unusual for people to provide a delivery address different from the card billing address, so automatically voiding these transactions is not recommended, but the order should be placed in suspension until further investigations are carried out.

It may be that merchants need to look at the transaction details in their entirety i.e.:

– tus $ amount of the purchase
– the number of items purchased
– does the IP match the state of the cardholder?
– does the delivery address match the billing address?

In regards to IP tracking, you can use a free tool such as is offered onDNSStuff.com (using the WHOIS Lookup) feature. Just enter the originating IP of the order in that box and if you find that the ISP doesn’t operate in the State of the cardholder, that could indicate possible fraud.

When in doubt, pick up the phone – call the cardholder and find out if they indeed made the transaction and if they did, ask them if it was on behalf of another company.

It’s a sad world that we have to spend so much time in battling online parasites; but the problem isn’t going to go away any time soon. In the world of ecommerce, anti-fraud vigilance is equally as important as marketing and product presentation skills.

Related resources:

Card fraud strategies

Pay per click anti-fraud strategies

Michael Bloch
Taming tus tsiaj nyaum
http://www.tamingthebeast.net
Tutorials, cov ntsiab lus, cuab yeej thiab software.
Web Marketing, Kev Loj Hlob Ntawm Kev Loj & Ecommerce Resources
____________________________

Copyright Copyright Information…. Tsab xov xwm no yog dawb rau reproduction tab sis yuav tsum tau reproduced nyob rau hauv nws cov entirety, xws li kev mus los & Tsab ntawv no yuav tsum muaj nyob nrog. Xyuas http://www.tamingthebeast.net Kev siv Internet li cas thiab web kev kawm ntawv, tutorials thiab cuab yeej! Subscribe rau peb nrov ecommerce/web tsim ezine!